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Abstract
With the increase in speed and availability of computers, our nation’s computer
and information systems are being attacked with increased sophistication. The Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Information Directorate (RI) is researching a next
generation network defense architecture, called Cybercraft, that provides automated
and trusted cyber defense capabilities for AF network assets. This research we con-
sider the issues to protect or obfuscate command and control aspects of Cybercraft.
In particular, we present a methodology to hide aspects of Cybercraft platform initial-
ization in context to formation of hierarchical, peer-to-peer groups that collectively
form the Cybercraft network. Because malicious code networks (known as botnets)
currently manifest many properties of obfuscating command and control sequencing,
we evaluate and consider our proposed methodology in light of leading bot detection
algorithms. This research subjects Bothunter to a series of tests to validate these
claims. We use a leading bot detection utility, Bothunter, and an ARP validation
tool, XArp, to build a case for the effectiveness of our approach. We present three
scenarios that correlate to how we believe Cybercraft platforms integrate in the future
and consider stealthiness in terms of these representative tools. Our research gives
emphasis on measurable hiding related to the Cybercraft initialization sequence, and
we show how common network protocols such as ARP, HTTP, and DNS may be
modified to carry C2 commands while evading common detection methods found in
current tools.
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Command And Control
I. Introduction
In his commentary on Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, Zhuge Liang, one of China’sgreatest military strategists and philosophers said [6]:
“...high walls and deep moats do not guarantee security, while strong ar-
mor and effective weapons do not guarantee strength. If opponents want
to hold firm, attack where they are unprepared; if opponents want to
establish a battlefront, appear where they do not expect you.”
Zhuge Liang’s observations of warfare ring as true today as when he penned
them over 1800 years ago. Although there have been many advancements in military
technology, no amount of ingenuity has changed the core property of war that a suc-
cessful attack is one that goes against an enemies weakness, and a strong defense is
contingent on hiding those weakness from the enemy. However, much has changed
with regard to where the battles take place and the speed at which they are fought.
Today, key military systems are constantly bombarded on the cyber battlefield. Hun-
dreds of attacks are waged against strategic computer and information systems with
varying sophistication from trivial to elite.
1.1 Research Motivation
To better prepare our nation for cyber war, the Air Force Research Lab’s In-
formation Directorate has launched a multi-year research project to bolster cyber
defenses.
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Named the Cybercraft project, this effort seeks to establish a Cybercraft that
automates tasks which increases the defenses of military computer and information
networks [16].
On 15 September 2008 the Air Force’s top leaders released a joint letter updating
the Air Force Mission. The new mission of the Air Force is: [9]
”The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly, fight and win ... in
air, space and cyberspace.”
Cyberspace again has been stressed by Air Force top leadership as vital to the
Air Force mission. This work contributes to the Air Force mission to ‘win’ the fight in
cyberspace by furthering the work that has already been made on the Air Force’s Cy-
bercraft Project. Specifically this research will develop a methodology for a stealthy
initialization sequence for when a new Cybercraft comes online and plugs into a com-
mand and control channel.
1.2 Research Statement
This research presents a method for stealthy Cybercraft initialization sequence
required to gain command and control (C2).
1.2.1 Research Contribution. It is predicted that 10% of all computers on
the Internet are being controlled by a botnet. [28] This creates a large concern for
the Air Force and its mission to protect its computer systems. Additionally the Air
Force needs to protect the methods, techniques and tools used in defense of these
malicious threats. Much work has already been done in the field of botnet detection
and prevention. The first contribution is to cast the Cybercraft C2 problem as a botnet
detection problem. Furthermore, we propose concrete scenarios based on current
botnet detection systems to evaluate possible techniques of stealthy initialization.
Finally, we provide an evaluation of Bothunter and other tools based on our analysis.
2
1.3 Thesis Organization
This document is divided into five chapters. Chapter II gives the background
that is needed to understand our research and methodology. Chapter III outlines my
proposed methodology, our hypotheses and our approach to setting up an experiment
to test those hypothesis. Chapter IV gives a detailed evaluation of our methodology
experiment. Chapter V gives recommendations for future work and concludes.
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II. Related Work
With the frequency and the level of sophistication of computer attacks on therise there is a current need to revamp the defense of computer and infor-
mation systems. The Department of Defense repels hundreds of computer attacks
every day, and on a global scale it is estimated nearly 10% of all nodes connected to
the Internet belong (unknowingly) to malicious multi-agent systems (bots). [28] The
fact that 10% of the worlds computers could be controlled by someone with malicious
intent is a strong enough threat against our nations security and well-being that a
project has been developed to mitigate that threat.
This chapter summarizes the background information necessary to better under-
stand our research regarding the development of a stealthy Cybercraft initialization
sequence. It is divided into nine sections. Section 1 Cybercraft more fully explains the
Cybercraft project, including its operational model. Because this research is based
around the Cybercraft project, it is important to understand the models that serve
as the foundation of the research. Section 2 Malicious Software briefly outlines many
forms of malware currently in practice. The characteristics and lessons learned from
these malicious software groups will be used to achieve a stealthy Cybercraft initializa-
tion. Section 3 Malware Taxonomy describes a taxonomy to describe the weaknesses
specific malware types use to exploit systems. This is important to distinguish be-
cause the type of vulnerability used has consequences on the level of effort required to
reveal the exploit. Section 4 introduces a rootkit that uses a virtual machine monitor,
highlighting a significant aspect of our methodology for stealthy Cybercraft initial-
ization. Section 5 Cybercraft as a Bot depicts command and control characteristics
of a botnet. It also compares a botnet command and control structure to that of
Cybercraft. Section 6 Cybercraft as a P2P Network describes the characteristics of a
Cybercraft initializing and joining a peer network. This is used in our methodology as
a way to successfully and stealthily gain command and control. Section 7 Cybercraft
in the Face of the Enemy assumes that Cybercraft could fall victim to malicious soft-
4
Figure 2.1: Artist’s rendition of a Cybercraft
ware. It relates the problem of enemies interfering with Cybercraft to the Byzantine
Generals problem classically used to describe overcoming fault tolerance issues in a
distributed system. Section 8 Bothunter introduces the Bothunter bot detector used
to test our stealthy initialization sequence and command and control methodology.
Finally, Section 9 Needle in a Haystack describes the challenge of sorting through le-
gitimate traffic patterns to find malicious information. The methodology for stealthy
Cybercraft initialization is based on modifying common information and hiding in
plain sight just like a needle in a haystack.
2.1 Cybercraft
The basis of our research is to show that a Cybercraft can stealthily gain com-
mand and control even in the presence of modern day bot detectors. This section
describes in greater detail the characteristics of a Cybercraft.
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The Cybercraft project is an undertaking headed by the Air Force Research
Lab, and its mission is “to automate cyber defense responses based on fused trust-
based situational awareness data and operator-defined rules of engagement” [16]. The
Cybercraft project is still in its infancy and is continuously growing its list of require-
ments and specifications.
The Cybercraft’s basic premise is that it is to be a lightweight distributed multi-
agent system composed of both software and hardware. [19] The Cybercraft’s mission
will be to defend and sustain military networks and assets and as such must [19,28]:
• monitor systems and respond in near real time
• respond according to current policies
• provide feedback to human operators of mission status
• support varying levels of autonomy
• be dynamically configurable
• follow a command structure
Because the Cybercraft is to be used by the military, it is expected to be scalable,
redundant and have a well defined command and control component. Undertaking
such a project brings with it many challenges. Dr. Phister [32] raised several impor-
tant questions that help define the role Cybercraft needs to play in defense of our
information systems. Some of the questions he asked were: What would the mission’s
of the Cybercraft be? How do you control the Cybercraft? How can we trust the
Cybercraft to do the right thing? These are all important questions, especially for the
operators and commanders that will be relying on the Cybercrafts. The answers to
these question are beyond the scope of this paper, however, this research does intend
to further the answer to how a Cybercraft should initialize, how it can do so stealthily
and how it can gain command and control.
6
Figure 2.2: Cybercraft Operational Concept [16]
2.1.1 Cybercraft Operation Model. One of the concepts behind Cybercraft
is that a Cybercraft can be resourced to carry out diverse missions. This is achieved
by executing different dynamic code or payloads. This can be viewed similarly to cur-
rent unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) flown today. Current UAVs in operations today
can be fitted with different sensors and/or weapons payloads to execute a variety of
missions. However, no matter the payload the airframe of the UAV doesn’t change
from mission to mission. Similarly to the UAV airframe, the Cybercraft platform
does not change from one mission to another. Instead the Cybercraft can be fitted
with different dynamic payloads. This gives Cybercraft flexibility in the missions it
can perform while maintaining a stable base of static code. For the purposes of our
research we are interested in the Cybercraft platform; and any further reference to
Cybercraft should be taken to refer to the Cybercraft platform.
One of the US Air Force’s seventeen Air and Space Power functions is Infor-
mation Operations (IO). According to USAF doctrine, information operations “are
actions taken to influence, affect, or defend information, systems, and/or decision-
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making to create effects across the battlespace.” [43] There are many scenarios where
a Cybercraft could be used to fulfill an Information Operation mission. Take for ex-
ample the scenario of a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS). Under a DDoS
attack many computers from around the globe converge on a specific target in an
attempt to inundate the target’s resources and bandwidth so completely that they
crash or slow to a stop. A DDoS could happen so fast that by the time it would take
a human to recognize a DDoS and to react to it, the damage could already be done.
This is when Cybercraft is important. Figure 2.2 displays the operational concept
for a Cybercraft mission such as the DDos attack previously outlined. As currently
defined a Cybercraft would not be activated without a specific set of Rules of En-
gagement (ROEs). These rules, authorized by someone of authority, would be set in
place prior to any action on the part of the Cybercraft. To illustrate the example,
a commander may authorize a Cybercraft to patrol the borders of the network and
keep a vigilant eye on the network resources.
Prior to being initialized, we envision one or more Cybercraft be installed on
computational nodes. The installation procedure will be accomplished by technicians
or operators. Once a Cybercraft connects, either at the software or hardware level, it
must then join the aggregate hierarchy, known as the Cybercaft ”cloud”. This com-
munication is necessary for a Cybercraft to plug into proper command and control
channels. This initialization sequence could generate a high level of computer com-
munication traffic, and if not properly executed could attract much attention. Since
one of the goals of the Cybercraft system is self-defense, a key facet of a defensive
system is to be stealty, or in other words, to remain undetected [14].
This research aims to quiet this communication and make the initialization as
stealthy as possible. Just like prisoners, it attracts less attention to whisper to a neigh-
bor than to pass communications in and out of prison. In this way if a Cybercraft
platform is connected to a command and control channel already, future Cybercraft
8
Figure 2.3: Boyds OODA Loop Sketch [3]
platforms can leverage this and limit the amount of noise or attention that unneces-
sary communications could warrant.
Once initialized and operational, a Cybercraft would be a functioning member
of a command and control structure. As a member of the command and control
structure the Cybercraft would receive payloads and policies to execute from other
sources. These communications would be encrypted covert channels (at a minimum).
Our interest is the initial communication sequence which all Cybercraft platforms
must use to join the command and control channel or “cloud”.
This Cybercraft Operational Concept parallels the US Air Force OODA Loop
concept that has proven so successful in air-to-air combat missions (see Figure 2.3).
The OODA or Observe - Orient - Decide - Act loop was first developed to express to
air-to-air fighter pilots that in a dogfight the pilot that was faster at realizing what
was going on and reacting to it was the pilot that was going to survive the encounter.
With one iteration of the OODA loop, a pilot observes what is going on around him,
make a decision, and then carry out that decision. Whatever action the pilot chooses
has ramifications and consequences. This requires the pilot to carry out another it-
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eration of the OODA loop, the cycle continues until the struggle is over. The pilot
that is able to get inside the others OODA loop, or rather have a tighter OODA loop
than the opponent is likely to be the victor.
This same concept can be applied to the cyber domain of information and com-
puter security. Since the medieval days of knights crossing moats and storming castle
gates, success on the battlefield is determined not only by guarding your weak areas,
but in how fast you can react when they are being attacked. In the cyber realm hu-
mans start at a severe disadvantage. Modern computing components are capable of
making billions of calculations every second. One current computer attacker has de-
veloped a weapon called Stormbot. The Stormbot is very sophisticated and may have
contaminated over 2 million computers. One organization has reported that Storm-
bot is currently infesting computers at the rate of 900,000 computers monthly. [8]
Assuming 2 million computers performing calculations at 1 billion per second equals
a force that is capable of 2.0x1015 or 2 quadrillion calculations every second. If such
a force was unleashed on any network it surely would not stand unless the network
was able to react at similar speeds.
2.1.2 Trust. One of the key questions of Cybercraft is how can a commander
trust that the Cybercraft is always going to do the right thing? This research stands
on the shoulders of several other scholars who have devoted their entire research on
the subject of trust. In their respective theses, Hunt and Stevens [15, 40] worked to
develop a framework to define trust models for the Cybercraft platform. At the root
of their trust models were the underlying components of current and historical data,
intrinsic knowledge of the remote agent’s abilities, and recommendations from other
agents [40]. To summarize their work they use historical data and peer recommenda-
tions to achieve a level of trust with another possible unknown entity. This mimics
human trust patterns in many ways [15]. Take for example a human trying to find
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a new auto mechanic or a new babysitter. One may search the phone book looking
for someone who has been established in the community for awhile, thus basing their
decision of trust on historical data. One might also query neighbors or friends in the
area and ask for recommendations. The level of trust then stems not only from the
recommendation given, but also from the level of trust that exists with the person
making the recommendation. If someone that is not known to be trustworthy gives
an excellent recommendation, it might not be accepted at the same level, if it was
given from someone known to be trustworthy.
In order to achieve a mature trust model, historical data and intrinsic knowledge
may help, but verification must play a primary role. In his farewell speech to the
nation President Ronald Reagan said regarding our position with the post cold war
Russian nation [33]:
“We must keep up our guard...as we make it clear that we will continue to
act in a certain way as long as they continue to act in a helpful manner.
It’s still trust but verify. It’s still play, but cut the cards. It’s still watch
closely. And don’t be afraid to see what you see.”
This notion of trust but verify is a key component of a trust model. It is another way
of saying I trust a given entity, but only after I have independently verified it. This
model of behavior is commonplace in circumstances where even one failure to identify
a malicious entity could result in very serious consequences, either in loss of life or
loss of resources. Take for example the guards posted at military installations, or the
Transportation Security Administration agents that screen people prior to flying on
an airplane. They have a “trust but verify” attitude. They trust a person only after
they have checked their credentials and completed all security measures that they
deem fit. These security measures take place each and every time one wishes to enter
a military installation or fly on a plane, regardless of the number of times one has
successfully done so previously. These measures are in place because it is impossible
to gauge if someone who has flown on an airplane countless times without incident
has malicious intent for the next trip planned. Letting such an individual through
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Figure 2.4: Ants taking poison back with them to their nests [42]
the security checkpoint based on such historical data or recommendations from peers
could spell doom for all of the passengers on the plane.
Since computer and information networks are vital to the security and well be-
ing of the United States, computer security guards should take the same attitude as
the physical security counterparts. In addition to the previously mentioned scenarios
in the physical world, Cybercraft has to deal with the added threat of zombies and
logic bombs. This introduces the more refined notion that Cybercraft trust is akin to
fusing possibly “dirty” or malicious data. To illustrate this point imagine a healthy
colony of ants (see Figure 2.4). Ants have established protection mechanisms from
other intruding insects, and if challenged the ants will swarm on the intruder and at-
tack it. Ants have a requirement to leave the security of their ant hills to accomplish
various external tasks, such as foraging for food. A well known method of eradicating
ants exploits these scout ants that are out foraging for food. A poison developed to
attract ants is placed outside of the ant hill (see Figure 2.4). When the ant comes in
contact with the poison, it does not immediately kill it. Instead, the ant is allowed
to carry the poison back into the ant hill. The ants, knowing that he is one of their
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Figure 2.5: Common trust structure that opens vulnerabilities of insider sabotage or
TrustTrap [30]
scout ants, let it back into the ant hill where he infects numerous more ants in the
heart of the ant hill. This attack is successful because the ants have established a
trust relationship based on history and peer recommendations. The ant that brought
the poison into the ant hill and put the death nail in the community may not have
even been aware.
2.1.3 Trust Trap. Another more formal example of trust relationships was
conducted by the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Melon [30]. It was the
aim of the study to analyze IT sabotage and observe the general characteristics of the
individuals that conducted internal sabotage and the circumstances that allowed it
to happen. In their work they presented what they call the “Trust Trap” (see Figure
2.5). It is pointed out in their work that the actual risk of insider attack is based on
the combination of behavioral and technical precursors of the malicious individual.
However, many offices and organizations try to foster a trusting relationship between
employees, and according to [30]:
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“Workplace relationships sometimes shortcut essential behavioral and tech-
nical monitoring procedures, or allow them to erode over time due to
competing pressures and priorities. Lower levels of monitoring lead to
undiscovered precursors, resulting in an overall lower perceived risk”
This trend of trusting the employees and work associates continues, and although
the actual risk of an individual doing something harmful does not change, the cycle
continues and the perceived threat continues to diminish until something happens that
is so severe that all parties notice.
It is essential then that Cybercraft trust models be created that do not fall
victim to the ‘Trust Trap’. A “trust but verify” approach must be taken every time
to every Cybercraft. This will increase the difficulty for individuals with malicious
intent to sabotage a Cybercraft and send it back into the trusted network, where like
the aforementioned ant can use an inside trust to destroy the Cybercraft protections.
2.2 Malicious Software
Malicious software or malware is a broad term that is used to define any type of
software that is malicious in nature. With the increase of sophistication that malware
authors are using to deploy their software, more specific terms are needed to identify
different types of malware. This section describes some of the key characteristics of
malicious software. In order to create a stealthy methodology for a Cybercraft ini-
tialization sequence I have pulled lessons learned from the below categories of malware.
McClure, Scambray and Kurtz [26] break malware down into five sub categories:
viruses, worms, rootkits and back doors, bots and zombies and finally trojan horses.
Each one of these malware types can be deployed by themselves or in conjunction
with one another to serve the purpose of the aggressor. To better understand the
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differences in each category a brief explanation will follow.
2.2.1 Viruses. Viruses are the term that most people are familiar with to
describe general malware. It is also the name that many of the security vendors have
adopted to defend against malware. People purchase anti-virus software to protect
against computer viruses, but todays software fights much more than only viruses. In
its purest definition a virus is “a program that can ‘infect’ other programs by modify-
ing them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself.” [7] In other words viruses are a
type of malware that need some other application to serve as the virus’ host. It then
will attempt to infect other applications with copies of itself. A key characteristic of
a computer virus is that it requires interaction [26] to reproduce itself. Viruses can
be programmed to attach themselves to a host, then upon some instruction either
internally or externally generated carry out almost any code instruction as the host.
2.2.2 Worms. A worm is a piece of software that plants copies of itself in
remote, electronically-connected nodes. [21] Worms differ from viruses in that they do
not require another application to serve as a host for the worm. Worms also do not
require any user intervention to help propagate the worm. In other words worms can
self-propagate via a network [26] and cause havoc utilizing system resources rather
than modifying the logic of applications. It has been seen that worms are capable
of carrying a secondary payload that can execute additional instructions [26]. How-
ever many worms simply eat network bandwidth and grow to monopolize network
resources. Many worms are programmed to scan their surroundings in order to au-
tonomously propagate. This network vulnerability scanning could draw attention if
it was to take place on a network with a vigilant network administrator
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2.2.3 Rootkits and back doors. Rootkits are larger than any single piece
of software. As the term kit implies, a rootkit is a collection of software application
that works together for a common purpose. According to [14] a rootkit is “a set of
programs and code that allows a permanent or consistent, undetectable presence on a
computer.” This definition really stresses the importance of a rootkit to be stealthy.
The name rootkit was derived as many of the first rootkits were developed to provide
“root” or full administrator access to a system. Other rootkits have been developed
for the purpose of hiding processes, ports or services and also used for software eaves-
dropping. Some rootkits took the form of packet sniffers, keyloggers or were used to
capture email. Because most rootkits are designed to be persistent (survive a com-
puter reboot) and stealthy they are a popular choice for back doors. A back door is a
malicious way for someone to gain access to the system without going through proper
identification and authentication channels. A rootkit might be written to allow any-
one with a particular password access to that computer. This allows the aggressor to
gain access to the target system at any time.
2.2.4 Bots and Zombies. Bots started to appear on the computer scene in
the early 1990s and were used as a tool to carry out administrative chores over a
network on many computers at once [2]. Since then, bots have been developed for
malicious purposes and have spawned many new terms. The traditional definition
of a bot according to [39] is “bots are simply software programs that perform some
action on behalf of a human on large numbers of infected machines.” This network
of infected machines are called bot-nets, and the infected machines themselves are
called zombies. The individual that has control over the bot-net is referred to as a
bot-herder. These bot-herders have been able to gain the resources and control of
over a hundred thousand computers at a time [2]. They are then able to use these
bot-nets for vary nefarious purposes, some of the most common uses for bot-nets are
denial of service floods, vulnerability scanners, e-mail harvesters, email spammers and
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allowing the bot herder to surf the Internet without revealing his/her location. Unlike
worms and viruses that work autonomously, bots rely on an individual to execute the
commands. A more in depth look at the command and control structure of bots can
be found in Chapter III §2.5.1
2.2.5 Trojan horses. Software trojan horses, or simply trojans, are software
programs “that does something other than, or in addition to, its purported function-
ality.” [26] Named after the stratagem that allowed the Greeks to finally enter and
conquer the city of Troy, software trojans are designed to be appealing, and when
unsuspecting users download or install the software the trojan also carrys out addi-
tional instructions to fulfill a secondary purpose. The secondary purpose could be
anything to establishing a backdoor to the system, to disabling anti-virus software to
formatting the hard drive. Today trojans have been found in everything from screen-
savers, to electronic greeting cards, to fake anti-virus software. Trojans are not only
a very effective way to get a user to install malware, but also have a high degree of
stealth associated with them. If a user installed a game it would not surprise them
to see a game process or registry keys referring to that game. This keeps the user
unsuspecting while the trojan is executing all of the malicious code.
2.3 Malware Taxonomy
The previous sections briefly introduced the different types of malware. This
section proposes a taxonomy of malware based on the weakness the malware exploits.
The taxonomy classifications have strong ramifications on the detectability level of
malware. I have considered this taxonomy in our methodology of a stealthy initial-
ization sequence.
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Within each type of malware, different approaches could be taken by the mal-
ware author to gain access to the system. Each different approach brings with it
certain tradeoffs. This taxonomy was formalized by noted security researcher Joanna
Rutkowska who uses an alternate definition of malware. Her definition focuses on
the specific relationship between the malware and the operating system (OS) and is
defined as follows: [29,35].
“Malware is a piece of code which changes the behavior of either the
operating system kernel or some security sensitive applications, without
a user consent and in such a way that it is then impossible to detect
those changes using a documented feature of the operating system or the
application.”
Below four classifications of malware are discussed along with their unique character-
istics.
Figure 2.6: Type 0 malware. Does not subvert OS directly [35]
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2.3.1 Type 0 Malware. Type 0 malware is defined as malware that does not
exploit any weaknesses in the OS, nor does it utilize any undocumented system tricks.
Rather it uses documented application programming interfaces (API). This results in
code that can be tracked and monitored by the OS. The difference between type 0
malware and all of the other honest programs running on the computer is simply the
authors intent (see Figure 2.6). Because type 0 malware does not use tricks to fool the
system, it usually will rely on fooling the users. Social engineering is a huge part of
type 0 malware. If a malware author can fool a user into downloading and running an
application, then there is no need to hide it from the OS. When a user sees the process
running in a task list there is no alert, because the user chose to install it. This is
typical in many trojan applications. Users think they are getting a new screensaver or
Internet browsing toolbar, and are not alarmed to see those same processes running
on their systems. However, many programs may lie to the users and be conducting
a secondary function such as password stealing or keylogging, but in type 0 malware
these secondary functions do not use tricks to go around established OS procedures.
2.3.2 Type I Malware. Type I malware is malware that changes data stored
in locations that are not supposed to be changed. This could happen either in memory
or in static executable binary files. Traditionally a malware author reverse engineers
a binary, or a Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) and introduce changes to the existing ex-
ecutables such that the malware author is able to accomplish a task (see Figure 2.7).
The changes could range from disabling security measures or escalating privileges, to
jumping and executing new code written by the malware author. Because the exploits
for this kind of code are as limitless as the imagination of malicious authors, the best
defense against type I malware is simply to ‘know thyself’. This means taking action
before a compromise and taking a snapshot of all of the important files on the sys-
tem. At a later time the user can compare the current files to those in the snapshot
and note any differences. Since the files associated with type I malware are not sup-
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Figure 2.7: Type 1 malware. Subverts OS code [35]
posed to be changed, any differences would stand out as being infected. Several tools
exist that work on this premise, including System Virginity Verifier by Rutkowska [34].
2.3.3 Type II Malware. Type II malware is similar to type I malware,
except that instead of infecting the code sections of the system that are not supposed
to change, type II malware targets the data portions of the system that by necessity
are supposed to change often (see Figure 2.8). For example, the data and pointers
inside kernel data structures is dynamic and constantly changing. It is possible to
change them to hide processes, device drivers, ports, or to even skew forensics. [14]
One method popularized in the ‘fu’ rootkit is Direct Kernel Object Manipulation
(DKOM) [4]. DKOM’d malware is classified as type II because the Kernel Objects
that are used to hide things are normally changed by the OS. This makes DKOM’d
malware extremely difficult to detect. Using DKOM techniques, linked lists can be
20
Figure 2.8: Type 2 malware. Subverts OS data [35]
snipped and resewn without affecting their functionality (see Figure 2.9)
2.3.4 Type III Malware. Type III malware is malware that uses hardware
virtualization. Virtualization is discussed more in depth in §2.4. Suffice to say for
now that type III malware is almost undetectable [35]. Type III malware separates
itself completely from the OS. Because the type III malware is ‘closer’ or ‘lower’ to
the hardware than the OS there is no way for the OS to have any clue of its presence.
There have been a few research groups that have made claims to be able to detect
the presence of a virtual machine (VM) running [10,11]. However it has been argued
that with virtualized hardware on the rise soon claiming to detect a Virtual Ma-
chine Based Rootkit (VMBR) by deducing that a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
is akin to claiming you have detected a botnet by observing that there is a network
attached. [37] Many have also claimed that in order to negate the affects of a VMBR,
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Figure 2.9: Severed and reswen DKOM’d link list hides rootkit process [29]
one only has to install a trusted verifiable VMM first. This defense was overcome by
events when Rutkowska showed that it is possible to nest VMMs [38]. This means
that if a VMBR is put underneath a trusted verifiable VMM, that running a trusted
VMM could hamper VMBR identification. Any side channel observances could be
attributed to the trusted VMM, so defenders will have a harder time deducing if any
timing attacks stem from a VMBR.
2.4 Virtualization
Virtualization, specifically a virtual machine based rootkit (see §2.3.4) is a key
piece to our methodology of a stealthy Cybercraft initialization sequence. This sec-
tion explains virtualization in more detail and introduces Bluepill, a proof of concept
virtual machine based rootkit.
“Virtualization is, at its foundation, a technique for hiding the physical charac-
teristics of computing resources from the way in which other systems, applications, or
end users interact with those resources [24]”. There are many types of virtualization
in practice today, each one abstracting a different component. A non-comprehensive
list is given by [24] as: operating system, server, desktop, streaming, storage, data,
clustering, grid computing, software-as-a-service and thin client. Each of these cat-
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Figure 2.10: Type 3 malware. Is completely separate from OS [35]
egories takes a service or a component and hides the physical characteristics of that
component from its users.
There are many benefits to deploying a virtualized system. One of the biggest
advantages to virtualization is an increased hardware utilization rate. It was ob-
served by [44] that most servers run at only 15% utilization. That translates to much
computer power sitting around being wasted. Under a virtualized system, a virtual
machine monitor is placed on one physical host computer. The host computer is
then installed with many guest systems. It was observed by [44] that current IT best
practices provision only one application per server. This is because if a server were
to fail, only one service or application would be affected. Virtualization provides the
capability to marry best IT practices while saving hardware costs, assuming the 15%
observation were true and six servers could be run on the hardware that was previ-
ously hosting only one. Since VMMs keep the servers in a sandbox, isolated from
the other servers, it still maintains the best practice of only one service or application
23
Figure 2.11: SubVirt before and after
infestation [20]
Figure 2.12: Blue Pill before and after
infestation
per server. This gives way to substantial cost savings, but not solely in hardware costs.
Historically classical virtualization or full hardware-assisted virtualization (HAV)
has not been widely supported or effective on the IA-32 or x86 architecture [1]. Since
the x86 is the most prominent hardware architecture in use today [1] new methods to
hardware virtualization would need to be explored. The landscape of virtualization
changed in 2007 when both Intel and AMD released virtualization extensions to the
x86 architecture. Intel calls their extension VT-x and AMD calls theirs Pacifica. Both
allow a virtual machine direct hardware access. This permits guest systems direct ac-
cess to resources that previously caused large delays. For example, guest computers
before HAV had great difficulty running three dimensional graphic intense programs
due to the software translating that was occurring between the video card drivers
and the VMM. Under HAV that bottleneck no longer exists and guest VMs can have
direct access to the video card.
2.4.1 Blue Pill. There have been many virtual machine monitors or hyper-
visors written, but none have received the scrutiny and attention as Rutkowska’s Blue
Pill. [36] In 2006 Rutkowska demonstrated a proof-of-concept VMM that could install
on a currently running host and transfer that host to a guest inside Blue Pill. This is
not the first project that married rootkit type delivery mechanisms with virtualiza-
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tion. Among the first that completed such a task were researchers at the University
of Michigan when they developed the SubVirt VMM. [20] There are many differences
that propelled Blue Pill to stardom over SubVirt, first, SubVirt needed to change the
boot loader and required a restart of the system, and it was based on a commercial
VMM which emulated virtual hardware which would make SubVirt easier to detect
(see Figure 2.11). Blue pill on the other hand (see Figure 2.12) overcame all the ob-
stacles facing SubVirt and produced an ultra thin VMM that promised full hardware
virutalization and could be installed on the fly and most controversially was touted
as “100% undetectable” [36].
2.5 Cybercraft as a Bot
The overall goal of this research is to create a methodology for a Cybercraft to
stealthily initialize and plug into a command and control structure. It is important
to the Cybercraft project to know if current bot detection techniques and tools will
identify Cybercrafts as well. This section serves to point out that bots and Cybercraft
do share some common traits. Furthermore, this section describes in more detail how
a bot(see §2.2.4) gains command and control.
There are many characteristics that a Cybercraft might share with a common
bot. Both a botnet and a Cybercraft need to be controlled by a human. In the case of
a botnet thousands of computers are led by a bot herder who will use the botnet for
some malicious purpose or for personal gain. A Cybercraft also has the requirement
to be human controlled. However, not all Cybercraft need react in the same manner.
This separates Cybercraft from a botnet in that Cybercraft are not zombies. In a
botnet all bots perform the same action at once. A Cybercraft does not have the
same limitation. Additionally, there could be multiple Cybercrafts in the area, and
on an execution command they could all perform different actions at different times.
But, in both cases it is important for bots and Cybercrafts to establish a command
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Figure 2.13: Two types of command and control methods [13]
and control channel.
2.5.1 Bot Command and Control. This section details many of the spe-
cific characteristics regarding botnet command and control. First, bot command and
control mechanisms are usually very stable in that they do not change much once
unleashed ‘in the wild’. Second, the command and control architecture of a botnet is
regarded by many as the ‘weakest link’ of the botnet [13]. Generally speaking there
are two types of bot command and control structure, the push style and the pull style
(see Figure 2.13) [13].
Under the push-style construct, a bot-herder or bot master can issue a control
command to the entire botnet. Usually this is done simultaneously to all zombies.
The zombies then receive the instruction and carry it out. Contrary to the push style
is the pull style. Under a push-style command and control structure, the zombies are
responsible to ‘check-in’ with the bot master. The bot master would then update the
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zombie with any new information or issue a command.
In addition to whether the bot, or a Cybercraft, utilizes a push or pull construct
style there still needs to exist some channel or protocol to facilitate the communica-
tion. Some of the more common channels currently in use today are: Internet Relay
Chat or (IRC)-oriented, Instant Message or (IM)-oriented, web oriented, and channels
that rely on their own protocols constructs [18].
IRC is a protocol engineered for synchronous conferencing. IRC allows someone
to speak to many people at the same time. This makes it a prime target for botnets.
Common IRC botnets require their zombies to connect to a specific IRC server chat-
room. The zombie then sits in the chatroom and listen until it gets instructions from
the bot master.
IM bots are similar to IRC bots but use common IM channels as communica-
tion channels. IM bots are not very popular due to many of the common IM services
requiring a user account. Common IM services also are established to make auto-
matic registrations very difficult. IM bots tend to be smaller than IRC bots for the
aforementioned reasons.
Web oriented bots commonly use the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to
send web traffic to a predefined server. Web bots have many advantages web traffic is
common, and as such most Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and firewalls will not
block the HTTP messsages. Web bots are also easier to engineer and implement.
The last major classification of bot communication channels is proprietary pro-
tocols. In order for a bot to get information across the Internet cloud, transport layer
protocols such as TCP/UDP or ICMP have to be used, otherwise the packets are not
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able to be routed and would never leave their local area network.
2.6 Cybercraft as a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Network
One of the aspects of Cybercraft initialization methodology that this work is
attempting to demonstrate is Cybercraft’s ability, upon initialization, to be able to
communicate with neighboring Cybercraft. This methodology requires a Cybercraft
to find out what other Cybercraft are nearby, and plug into any command and con-
trol channel that is required under the rules of engagement. In order to accomplish
this, a Cybercraft must have some way to authenticate messages that it sends and
receives. Cybercraft in this respect resembles a P2P or mobile ad-hoc network. A
survey has already been completed which analyzed different structured P2P overlay
networks against the requirements and specification for Cybercraft [31]. Because Cy-
bercraft can be deployed on different geographic or functional missions it lends itself
to a hierarchical peer-to-peer (HP2P) construct.
Figure 2.14: The Chord system showing a mapping of items to nodes [41]
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2.6.1 Chord. As part of the initialization sequence it is important that a
Cybercraft be able to communicate with neighboring Cybercraft. The ability to plug
into a command and control network local to the Cybercraft has many advantages.
Section 2.1.1 introduced the analogy of a prisoner whispering to other prisoners in
an attempt to increase the stealthiness of the communications. A prisoner that can
relay all necessary information by listening to a neighboring prisoner is much faster
than relying on written letters to family and friends to relay the same information. In
addition it is likely that any communication in or out of the prison would be subject to
inspection by prison officials. This means that any information regarding something
like an escape attempt would be captured and not relayed to the prisoner.
Like the network of prisoners relaying information, Chord presents an system
for Cybercrafts to relay information. In order to facilitate a local communications
group of Cybercrafts a system must be identified. The Chord system [41] is a good
choice for Cybercraft. The Chord system is a distributed hash table (DHT) system
that is known to be versatile and scale very well. Under a Chord system each node
uses an m-bit identifier to map keys to specific entities. These entities can be any-
thing: files, commands, instructions etc. The Chord system maintains a finger hash
table of successor nodes which allows for quick access (O(log(N)) [41]) and relatively
low overhead when peers drop in and out of the constellation. Under a Chord system
a Cybercraft could join the Chord constellation to find all of the information it needs
and stay in or leave the constellation without large disruptions. Figure 2.14 depicts
a Chord system with five actual nodes in a four bit (16 max nodes) configuration.
Each real node is responsible for the space between it and its predecessor node. This
limits the amount of information that has to be shared whenever a new node comes
online. Consider the example in Figure 2.14, a new node 10 is to come online. It
would only have to transfer information from node 12 (anything associated with keys
8, 9 and 10). If a node is to leave the constellation a node would only have to transfer
its information to its successor node. One drawback to this is if a node was to fall
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out before it could transfer its information to its successor, the constellation would
lose the information the node contained. For this purpose redundancy could be in-
troduced. The issue of redundancy and bad data is discussed in §2.7.1.
2.6.2 Encryption. Knowing that the Cybercraft will be communicating with
other Cybercraft brings on additional security concerns. As mentioned in §2.1.2 it is
necessary for one Cybercraft to be able to trust other Cybercrafts. Much work has
been accomplished in the field of secure multi-party computations (SMC).
“By integrating cryptographic protocols based on secure multi-party com-
putations, software-only protection mechanism can be designed to guar-
antee the execution integrity and data confidentiality of an agent while it
is executed at the remote host.” [27]
The Cybercraft project faces a steep challenge with regards to communication se-
curity. It has been shown [27] that there are distinct trade-offs when using secure
multi-party computations within such a project as Cybercraft. As the demand for
security increases, so does the number of calculations each Cybercraft platform has
to make to keep the communications secure. This also increases the number of mes-
sages that need to be transmitted to successfully handshake with other cybercraft
and conduct any security checks necessary (see §2.1.2). The benefits of encryption
are evident however, if a Cybercraft is compromised. Cybercraft compromise in more
detail in the next section.
2.7 Cybercraft in the Face of the Enemy
If a Cybercraft is to be able to successfully plug into a command and control
channel it must do so even when its enemies might be trying to capture the Cy-
bercraft and reverse engineer its initialization sequence. This section discusses what
defensive measures must be considered to be able to initialize when an enemy dis-
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rupts the Cybercraft communication network or scrutinizes the Cybercrafts messages.
If captured and analyzed by an enemy, some information could be gained from
observing the Cybercraft’s messages. If encryption is used, a Cybercraft would only
provide evidence that messages are being sent and to whom. No knowledge is gained
regarding the information or command and control channel unless the encryption is
broken. Of course there are many defensive techniques that could be used to confuse
any enemy observers such as dummy messages that are sent so that the enemy could
not ascertain which are the true messages and which are the dummy messages, but
the enemy would see messages. Thus, part of the Cybercraft stealthiness must rely
on the messages not being observed. This is discussed more in §2.9.
Another defensive measure that needs to be considered is that of redundancy.
It was introduced in §2.6.1 that a Cybercraft might be taken offline without properly
sharing its information to neighboring Cybercraft. This is due to network problems,
hardware failure, etc. It is important therefore to incorporate some redundancy into
the network so that if a Cybercraft goes offline other dependent Cybercraft don’t also
loose the required information.
Another problem to consider is that of imposter Cybercrafts. Section 2.1.2 dis-
cussed the importance of a Cybercraft trusting other Cybercraft. Imagine a scenario
where a Cybercraft is attempting to initialize and plug into a command and control
channel only to find that the command and control channel is being operated by the
enemy. This problem of Cybercraft reliability and consistency maps to the following
Byzantine Generals problem.
2.7.1 Byzantine Generals. In 1982 a landmark paper was written called
‘The Byzantine Generals Problem’ [22]. The paper outlined a scenario where many
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Figure 2.15: Two honest Generals passing verbal messages with one traitor General
divisions of the Byzantine Army were camped out surrounding an enemy city. Each
of the divisions were commanded by a Byzantine General. It is the mission of the
Generals to observe the actions within the hostile city and develop a course of action.
The General’s only capability of communicating with each other is via messengers. Of
course, those messengers could get captured and replaced with enemy spy agents, or
it is possible for a General to go rouge and wish harm upon the Byzantine Army (see
§2.1.3 regarding insider threats). With the possibility of the sender or the message
being compromised it is still vital that all honest Generals agree on a united course of
action. For simplicity, the only actions could be to either attack the city or retreat.
Both actions are acceptable, however only if all Generals make the same decision. It
is a failure if some of the Generals and their divisions retreat while others attack.
This abstract problem was developed to help solve the problems regarding reli-
ability and consistency within distributed systems. The Generals represent processes
or nodes in a distributed environment. The pedagogical example of distributed sys-
tem is the ATM bank machine. If a bank customer attempted to withdraw money
from his account, but there was a server failure somewhere down the chain, how will
the failure get recognized? How do you prevent the system from withdrawing from a
user’s account, but not give them the money? The Byzantine General paper showed
32
Figure 2.16: Two honest Generals passing signed written messages with one traitor
General
that when using simple messages for every traitorous General m you would need
3m+1 loyal Generals if the loyal Generals are to be successful. Notice on Figure 2.15
that with less than 3m + 1 loyal Generals they are not all in agreement, and cannot
deduce which General is the traitor.
Suppose now that the Generals were to improve their communications proto-
cols. Suppose that instead of verbal messages that the Generals were required to
sign a separate letter to each other General with their vote on what action should
be performed. Then after a General has received all of the letters from all the other
Generals they are put together. At this point each General would have a local list of
all of the votes that all the other Generals have given to just them. This is shown as
the leftmost columns in Figure 2.16. After all of the first round of messages have been
tallied the Generals are to send out another letter to all of the other Generals with a
note detailing all of the votes that General has received from the other Generals. This
is depicted by the green sets going across the green lines of Figure 2.16. Note, the
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traitor is not following protocol, he is sending garbage rather than the requisite letters.
At the cost of a second round of letters, and the time it takes to process all of
the letters all honest Generals will not only be able to make the correct decision, but
they are also able to identify who all of the traitorous Generals are in the mix. With
signed messages you can deal with any number of m traitors, regardless of how many
honest Generals exist.
If a Cybercraft is to not fall victim to an impostor, it needs to be in communi-
cation with 3m+1 loyal Cybercrafts for every m impostors, or use an implementation
where signed messages could be used. Of course using signed messages increases the
number of message traffic that would need to be sent and has a detrimental effect on
the stealthiness of the Cybercraft initialization sequence.
2.8 Bot Hunter
Figure 2.17: BotHunter Architecture [12]
Bothunter is a bot detection utility that claims to be “...the first real-time anal-
ysis system that can automatically derive a profile of the entire bot detection process,
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including the identification of the victim, the infection agent, the source of the egg
download, and the command and control center” [12].
Bothunter is a trio of IDS components that attempts to correlate data from
watching inbound and outbound information. Figure 2.17 shows the architecture
of Bothunter. A large portion of Bothunter is similar to any other rule based IDS.
Bothunter is special in the fact that it uses two other IDS components that serve to
monitor the entire network traffic and make observances that are special to botnets.
For example in a botnet when an order is given all bots immediately respond. If there
are five bots in one network and Bothunter notices that they all similarly react in the
same way at the same time it can put those pieces together and create a profile that
alerts a network administrator or a forensics examiner to the bot.
Bothunter was released for public distribution in November 2008. Its authors
have made claims that BotHunter represents the most in-depth network-based mal-
ware infection diagnosis system available today [17]. Section 2.5 drew the comparison
of Cybercraft and botnets sharing similar characteristics. This research uses Both-
unter to see if a Cybercraft initializing and joining a command and control channel
will be flagged as a botnet. Furthermore in Chapter 3 and 4 Bothunter is put to a
series of tests to assess many of the claims that its authors are making.
2.9 Needle in a Haystack
One of the ways that the stealth of a Cybercraft is measured is by evading
detection of such utilities as Bothunter. Another technique to improve the stealthi-
ness of Cybercraft messages is to hide in plain sight. One of the main characteristics
that differentiate a good rootkit from a bad one is the concept of stealth (see §2.2.3).
In [14], the authors point out that one of the most successful ways to remain stealthy
is to “hide in plain sight”. One of the reasons that looking for a needle in a haystack
is a daunting task is because a needle looks a lot like a straw of hay, even though in
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actuality a needle is very different from a straw of hay.
If one was to examine the traffic of a network there are many protocols that are
common. Internet traffic can almost always be found in the form of HTTP messages
on port 80 for example. This is the concept behind many firewalls and intrusion
detection systems. They exist to deny things that are different, or in other words,
should not be there. If a malicious packet of information looks similar to a legitimate
one it would be allowed to pass through the defenses (see §2.1.2). The only other de-
fense is relying on the skill of a network administrator or forensics examiner to know
the network well enough to spot malicious traffic through examination of network logs.
The authors of [23] admit that examination of network logs or “network foren-
sics” is a challenge. Problems include the sheer volume of data as well as the number
of protocols that could be encountered. In addition, it is a daunting task to stay
ahead of the network activity of popular software applications.
The goal of this research is to create a stealthy Cybercraft initialization se-
quence. The methodology is based on hiding in plain sight and evading automatic
utilities such as Bothunter. After all the automatic tools have sniffed the network traf-
fic, in the end, the stealthiness of this research maps to a human searching through
network logs. This is understood to be an arduous task and a hard problem.
2.9.0.1 Address Resolution Protocol. ARP packets are critical to the
methodology for a Cybercraft to stealthily initialize and plug into a command and
control channel. ARP is a special protocol that is used to resolve a computers IP from
its MAC address. The key components of a ARP packet are the source IP address, the
source MAC address, the destination IP address and the destination MAC address.
Depending what information is trying to be ascertained, certain fields will be used
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and others could be left blank.
For example, imagine the scenario where a computer is trying to send a packet
of information to IP 1.2.3.4 but it does not know the MAC address of the recipient. In
order to find out what MAC address is associated with IP address 1.2.3.4, a broadcast
is issued to all of the devices that share a network with the computer. The message
is basically if you are 1.2.3.4 send your MAC address to the requester. Of course not
all fields are relevant. If I am asking for your MAC address then it is not necessary
to put anything in the Destination MAC address field. Any information placed inside
the Destination MAC address field normally will not even be looked at. Filling the
destination MAC address on an ARP request would be like telling a device their own
address, which if known would remove the need to send the request in the first place.
Of course there is not a penalty for using that space for other reasons. ARP requests
are a very common part of a network. Computers do not usually keep ARP caches for
a long time and are constantly probing their neighbors for addresses. These benefits
can be leveraged to communicate more than just addresses. If a code was placed in
the unused fields of an ARP request and inversely an ARP reply devices on a shared
LAN could communicate back and forth. This research will use these modified ARP
messages to stealthily communicate command and control information between Cy-
bercraft platforms.
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III. Experimentation
This chapter outlines our research methodology for testing the stealthiness of aninitialization sequence for a Cybercraft platform. All assumptions regarding
the framework of the methodology used are given and our research hypothesis and
goals are presented. Three scenarios are introduced which serve to simulate common
situations in which a Cybercraft platform may likely operate. An explanation is given
regarding how the initialization sequence operates under each of the three different
scenarios. The scenarios are simulated in a controlled environment. The results of
the experiments are found in Chapter four.
3.1 Problem Definition
The principal aim of this research is to create a stealthy initialization sequence
methodology for the Cybercraft platform to plug into a command and control channel.
§2.1 explains the basics of Cybercraft while §2.5 relates the similarities of a Cybercraft
and a botnet. Specifically, the similarities that both require plugging into a command
and control channel. §2.8 details Bothunter, a current tool that claims to be capable
of detecting botnets and their associated command and control in real time [12]. This
research examines the claim made by Bothunter that it can in fact detect botnets in
real time. Additionally, Bothunter is used to gauge the stealthiness of the proposed
Cybercraft initialization sequence.
3.2 Hypothesis and Goals
This research attempts to satisfy the following goals:
• Cast the Cybercraft C2 problem as a botnet detection problem.
• Create a methodology for a Cybercraft platform to stealthily initialize and join
a command and control channel
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• Provide an evaluation of Bothunter based on our analysis
• Test that the aforementioned initialization sequence will not be detected by the
botnet detection tool Bothunter
The first contribution of our research is to cast the Cybercraft C2 problem as a
botnet detection problem. As discussed in §2.5 Cybercraft platforms share multiple
characteristics with botnets. The main goal of this research project is to create a
stealthy initialization sequence for a Cybercraft platform to plug into a command
and control channel. This goal directly contributes to the Cybercraft project. It is a
requirement for a Cybercraft to be able to initialize and communicate in a command
and control channel. This research sets out to answer that requirement, which will
not only be of value to the Cybercraft project, but to the U.S. Air Force’s mission to
fight and win in Cyberspace [9]. It is our hypothesis that an initialization sequence
that plugs a Cybercraft platform into a command and control channel is not only pos-
sible, but it can be shown to be stealthy with regards to current botnet detection tools.
Another goal of this project is to test the claims made by the authors of Both-
unter. §2.8 explains in greater detail what Bothunter is and how it works. In order
to make any claims as to the stealthiness of the proposed Cybercraft initialization
process it must first be demonstrated that Bothunter is in fact competent in detect-
ing botnets. Our definition of stealhiness can be found in §3.3.1. Bothunter was
born in the academic community, and this research is of value to that same academic
community by serving as an additional unbiased voice as to the validity of the claims
made by the authors of Bothunter [12]. It is our hypothesis that Bothunter works as
advertised and is successful in detecting a number of Botnets in real time.
The final goal of our research is to show that our proposed initialization sequence
for Cybercraft will not be detected by Bothunter. It is intended that the initializa-
tion sequence be a stealthy one. For the purposes of this research, the initialization
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sequence was considered stealthy if common stealthy techniques were employed and
it was not detected by the real time botnet detector Bothunter. It is our hypothesis
that our initialization sequence incorporates many stealth techniques learned from
the malicious software community 2.2 and will be capable of evading Bothunter.
3.3 Setup
In order to successfully achieve the goals of this research we have created a
controlled research environment. The purpose of this environment was to simulate,
as best as possible, the real world; but, because we used known malicious botnets,
the environment was completely isolated from any other network. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.1, we have created two networks. The first network (10.1.30.x) modeled a
trusted inside network as could be found in an office. The second network (10.1.90.x)
modeled an outside untrusted network which could represent someone plugged into
the Internet. For the sake of convenience we created this research environment within
VMware Workstation 6 running over commodity hardware running Windows XP Pro-
fessional SP3. The inside network contained five workstations running Windows XP
Professional SP2. The outside network only required one workstation to simulate an
untrusted attacker outside the network and also runs Windows XP Professional SP2
(see Figure 3.1).
In order to setup the inside network, first we installed Bothunter, and on the
outside network we installed UnrealIRCd an IRC server and Easy Web Server an
Apache web server. The IRC server was set up for botnet connections. The web
server was set up so simulated users inside the network have real webpages to down-
load. The purpose of using real webpages was to pass real HTTP traffic back and
fourth on the network and under the nose of the botnet detector. In addition to
the aforementioned software we installed Wireshark, a network protocol and packet
analyzer tool, on all of the inside and outside workstations. All of the workstations
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Figure 3.1: Proposed network for experiment
have mIRC, an IRC client application, installed. MIRC allowed us to connect to
the UnrealIRCd server and send IRC messages back and forth. Finally we installed
Packet Builder on (10.1.30.16) of the inside workstations. Packet Builder allows us to
build any kind of TCP, UDP or ARP packet that we desire and send it on the network.
3.3.1 Measuring Stealth. The main focus of this research was to create a
stealthy methodology for a Cybercraft initialization sequence. This research casts our
methodology as a bot detection problem, and as such measures the stealthiness of the
methodology based on state of the art Bothunter detection utility.
We understand that evading a bot detection tool does not completely guarantee
that the methodology is stealthy. The field of computer forensics is filled with differ-
ent methods for identifying the existence of programs that are designed to be stealthy.
Although many utilites and methods exist, we feel that because a Cybercraft
platform shares many similarities to botnets, using a bot detection tool is a good
measure of stealthiness. Bothunter was chosen as the bot detection tool because it
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is lauded as being the most advanced bot detection tool, and the first one that can
detect bots in real time [12].
3.4 Approach
The first step needed for our experimentation is to ascertain if the bot detection
tool Bothunter fulfills its claims to be able to detect botnets in real time. To this
end, we conducted experiments similar to the ones first conducted by the authors of
Bothunter and can be found in [12]. In their experiments they tested 10 different
bots. For our purposes we only tested Bothunter against four bots. Three of the bots
were used in the original testing and one (Sdbot) was not tested against Bothunter
in the original paper. See Table 3.1 for a list of bot names and versions used during
this research.
Table 3.1: The name and version of the bots chosen to use in experiment
Bot Name Bot Version
1 Agobot 3-priv4
2 Phatbot alpha1
3 Rxbot 7.5
4 Sdbot 05b
In order for the botnets to work properly on our closed research network it was
necessary to recompile all of the bots specifying the command and control IRC server
and channel that were used. Since we do not have a working DNS server on the closed
research network, we hardcoded the IRC servers IP address. The external worksta-
tion used to simulate a malicious bot herder and host the IRC server is 10.1.90.15
(see Figure 3.1). Once compiled we introduced the bots onto four of the five internal
workstations. Next we were able to ‘herd’ them through the IRC command and con-
trol channel.
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Once the bots are functional on the research network, the next step conducted
was to gage the effectiveness of Bothunter by running a series of tests. Each test lasted
90 minutes in length, and the number of malicious profiles that Bothunter generated
were recorded. Figure 3.2 shows a sample screenshot of Bothunter from [17] with
malicious profiles generated identifying the existence of botnets.
Figure 3.2: Screen shot from Bothunter [17]
We identified twelve tests designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of Bothunter
(see table 3.2). The first test is strictly a control to see if Bothunter announced any
‘false positives’. Tests 2-5 identified if Bothunter could detect the respective bots.
Tests 6 & 7 were designed to see if Bothunter is affected by network traffic volume.
Tests 8 - 10 were to gauge how the level of scanning affected Bothunters detection
rate, and finally tests 11 & 12 were designed to see how Bothunter handled bots
that were scanning in addition to increased levels of network traffic. The traffic
used was captured traffic from an exercise network during AFIT’s participation in
a Cyber Defense Exercise. For the exercise a complete network was set up that
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simulated the functions that a real operational network would require such as email,
DNS, a webserver, instant messaging (chat), active directory. The exercise network
IP address range was 10.1.30.1 /24. This is the same network mask as our research
network. This was done so that all additional traffic introduced appeared to Bothunter
as originating from the inside network. The additional traffic was introduced via the
software program PReplay 1.1, a tool designed to replay captured packets.
Table 3.2: A brief description of the series of tests performed to ascertain Bothunter
effectiveness
# Test Discription # Test Discription
1 Network only 7 Agobot with heavy traffic
2 Agobot only 8 All bots, no scanning
3 Phatbot only 9 All Agobot scans, conservative
4 Rxbot only 10 All Agobot scans, aggressive
5 Sdbot only 11 All Agobot scans, conservative, light traffic
6 Agobot with light traffic 12 All Agobot scans, conservative, heavy traffic
There are two main criteria that we looked for during the twelve tests.
• If Bothunter identified the bot
• If Bothunter identified the command and control channel
These two criteria are particularly important to our research. After the completion of
each 90 minute test, we imported the data into a condensed table (see tables 3.3, 3.4).
3.4.1 Assumptions. The next step to realize our methodology of a stealthy
Cybercraft initialization sequence was to simulate the sequence itself. There are a
number of assumptions that we have made with regards to the status of the Cyber-
craft platform. This section serves to explain the assumptions we have made.
The purpose of this research project was to develop a methodology for stealthy
Cybercraft initialization. It was not to build a Cybercraft platform. With that being
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Table 3.3: Showing bot detection as first criteria
Test # of Profiles
Description Detected
Network only
Agobot only
Phatbot only
Rxbot only
Sdbot only
Agobot with light traffic
Agobot with heavy traffic
All bots, no scanning
All bots, light scanning
All bots, heavy scanning
All bots, light scanning, light traffic
All bots, light scanning, heavy traffic
Table 3.4: Showing C2 channel detection as second criteria
Test C2 Channel
Description Detected
Network only N/A
Agobot only
Phatbot only
Rxbot only
Sdbot only
Agobot with light traffic
Agobot with heavy traffic
All bots, no scanning
All bots, light scanning
All bots, heavy scanning
All bots, light scanning, light traffic
All bots, light scanning, heavy traffic
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considered it was assumed that a Cybercraft platform exists. In order to increase the
Cybercraft platforms stealthiness it was assumed that the platform is modeled after
the virtual machine based rootkits that are discussed in §2.3.4 & §2.4.1.
Figure 3.3: Showing that a Virtual Machine Based Rootkit is closer to the hardware
than the Guest Operating System
By using a VMBR the client is not able to see the messages generated by the Cy-
bercraft initialization sequence. We assumed that the rootkit, which would be closer
to the network interface card than the workstation operating system (see Figure 3.3),
would be capable of hiding any evidence of the Cybercraft’s existence from any user
of the workstation itself. This greatly reduces the chances of Cybercraft platform
detection, and leaves the open communication as the greatest source of exposure. As
noted in §2.9, finding malicious traffic while sniffing all of the traffic can be a daunting
task. We assumed that this initialization sequence takes place on an operational net-
work that is allowing and using ARP, HTTP and DNS protocols. If this initialization
sequence were to be executed in a network where the aforementioned protocols were
not allowed, the Cybercraft platform would stand out and risk exposure.
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Another assumption was that the rootkit is already planted on the guest work-
stations. It is not the intent of this research to develop effective infection or instal-
lation techniques. A summary of many common installation vectors can be found in
§2.2. Also, as previously mentioned it is beyond the scope of this research project to
develop a working Cybercraft platform. Instead, it was assumed that the Cybercraft
platform follows the pseudocode outlined in the Cybercraft initialization sequence
(see Algorithm 1). In order to not risk unnecessary exposure, the initialization se-
quence first tried to contact other Cybercraft on the same network as this is a quieter
operation (see §2.6.1). After looking locally, the Cybercraft attempted to retrieve
information using DNS messages. If unsuccessful the Cybercraft attempted to reach
a predetermined webpage for information. Each of these scenarios are broken down
and explained in greater detail in the following sections (see§3.5.1, §3.5.2, §3.5.3).
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for Cybercraft Initialization Sequence
1: while Cybercraft Terminate Order Not Received do
2: Choose a random number of seconds→ S1
3: Listen S1 seconds to network traffic for neighboring Cybercraft
4: if Neighboring Cybercraft are found then
5: Note Cybercraft IP and MAC address
6: Wait some random amount of time → S2
7: Contact neighboring Cybercraft
8: else
9: Send a modified DNS message
10: end if
11: if Special DNS message is returned then
12: Request C2 information from DNS reply
13: else
14: Send a HTTP request to a hardcoded address
15: end if
16: if Special HTTP reply is returned then
17: Request C2 information from HTTP reply
18: end if
19: end while
Another assumption made is that the Cybercraft platform would be capable of
joining a Chord type system as explained in §2.6.1. With the capability of joining a
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P2P local network the Cybercraft is able to communicate with other Cybercraft and
be able to plug into a command and control network locally (see Figure 3.4). Local
communications is preferred over sending communications outside the network, which
might be scrutinized closer by a firewall, IDS or router and increases the potential of
alerting a network administrator to the presence of the Cybercraft.
Figure 3.4: CyberCraft displayed as a Chord Ring of Virtual Machine Monitors com-
municating with each other
The final assumption is that the Cybercraft initialization sequence works the
same in a real world network with separate pieces of commodity hardware as it per-
forms in the VMware closed research network. Since VMware gives each virtual ma-
chine access to actual hardware, it is assumed that the initialization sequence would
act the same in the real world and that any detection made by Bothunter on the
research network would be made in the real world and vice versa.
3.5 Scenarios
The next step of the research is to test the Cybercraft initialization sequence
against Bothunter and see if Bothunter read the Cybercraft platform network traffic
and identified the traffic as a botnet. Three scenarios are introduced that were sim-
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ulated on the research network with Bothunter running. Each scenario has different
degrees of stealthiness and conversely different degrees of risk of Cybercraft compro-
mise and are explained in the next three subsections.
Figure 3.5: First scenario, only connection is using HTTP
3.5.1 Scenario I. The first scenario assumed initializing a Cybercraft when
there are no other Cybercraft on the same local network. Bothunter was running on
this network and, by using a hub, has full visibility of all network traffic. This scenario
requires the Cybercraft platform to attempt to connect to a webserver and download
a webpage (see Figure 3.5). It was assumed that the webpage addresses has been
hardcoded into the Cybercraft platform. For stealthiness many webpages could be
used, including decoy web pages. In this exchange the Cybercraft platform requests a
particular webpage that was identified ahead of time to signal to the webserver that
a Cybercraft platform is attempting to plug into a command and control network or
channel. Once received, the web server could create a webpage specific for that Cy-
bercraft with encrypted instructions inside the HTTP replies. Of the three scenarios,
we hypothesized that this scenario is the least likely to succeed. I believe this because
the method of communicating resembles other botnets (see §2.5.1). The HTTP traffic
generated by the Cybercraft platform were regular HTTP GET requests. Of course,
in practice stenography could be used to further hide Cybercraft actions from any
malicious observers, sniffers or network administrators.
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Figure 3.6: Second scenario, Cybercraft gains plugs into local Chord Structure using
modified ARP messages
3.5.2 Scenario II. The goal of the second scenario is to simulate initializing
a Cybercraft on a network that has other Cybercraft operating on it (see Figure 3.6).
This scenario assumes that at least one of the preexisting Cybercraft is plugged into
a command and control channel using HTTP (see Scenario 1 §3.5.1). In this scenario
the Cybercraft listens for other Cybercraft via modified ARP messages. ARP was
chosen because it is small and quick and available to everybody on the same LAN.
After a random amount of time the Cybercraft attempted to communicate with one
of the neighboring Cybercraft and request to join a Chord based communications
system. The traffic for the following steps was created:
• New Cybercraft contacts established Cybercraft
• A handshake occurs
• New Cybercraft receives instructions on its place in the Chord architecture
• New Cybercraft contacts Chord successor and transfers information
These steps simulated the steps discussed in §2.6.1. In order to reduce the
risk of compromise all data was assumed encrypted as per §2.6.2. The second step
of a handshake was necessary to be able to independently validate each other as per
§2.1.2. For the purposes of this research the handshake was limited to a 96-bit request
message, a 48-bit response message and a 480-bit information transfer. Once fully
connected to a local Chord structure, it was assumed that a Cybercraft can send
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and receive command and control instructions, first locally, then via the tethered
connection to the outside.
Figure 3.7: Thrid scenario, Cybercraft platform connection to outside C2 structure
via DNS messages
3.5.3 Scenario III. The final scenario assumed the same Chord structure
exists similar to scenario 2 (see §3.5.2). This scenario also assumes that a Cybercraft
was in place somewhere outside the network boundary, where it could sniff DNS
requests. We also assumed that this Cybercraft is outside of the perimeter and has
unfettered access to a command and control channel outside the local network (see
Figure 3.7). This scenario was to test if sending DNS requests would trip the botnet
detectors. This scenario should arouse less suspicion on the part of a botnet detector
as DNS is a much less common command and control channel than HTTP traffic.
3.6 Summary
This chapter explained our research methodology for testing a stealthy initial-
ization sequence for the Cybercraft platform. It detailed the hardware and software
that we used as a test network as well as outlined the pseudocode for the Cybercraft
initalization sequence. This chapter listed all the assumptions made to complete this
research. Finally, it detailed the experiments we conducted to test if Bothunter was
capable of detecting bots in real time, as well as outline the Cybercraft initialization
scenarios that we tested against Bothunter.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter gives the detailed results of our experimentations that were outlinedin Chapter 3. This chapter explains the results of testing Bothunter against
known bots. It also explains the results of testing a Cybercraft initialization sequence
against Bothunter. The significance of the findings is presented. Another experiment
was presented that could work in parallel to bot detection to automatically detect a
Cybercraft when using our presented methodology.
4.1 Testing Bothunter
The purpose of this research effort was to identify a stealthy initialization se-
quence for a Cybercraft to plug into a command and control channel. It was presented
in §2.5 that the characteristics of a Cybercraft could expose itself to botnet detec-
tors. Bothunter was selected to test if it would detect the Cybercraft when using the
initialization sequence presented in §3.4.1. However, before any claims were made as
to the stealthiness of the Cybercraft initialization sequence Bothunter must first be
tested to ascertain that it in fact is capable of detecting bots in real time.
In their paper [12], the authors of Bothunter used their bot detection tool against
Agobot3-priv4, Phatbot alpha1 and Rxbot 7.5. We acquired these bots along with
Sdbot 05b to perform our own tests against Bothunter. The first step that was per-
formed was to compile the four bots with the IP address of our IRC server. All four
bots use IRC as their means of establishing a command and control channel. Of the
four bots SDbot was the most straightforward to compile. We originally ran into
difficulty compiling Agobot and Phatbot. They were written using single threaded
libraries, the complier we were originally working with would not build the file cor-
rectly. This setback was easily fixed by reverting to an older compiler. All four bots
required us to identify the host address of the IRC server to be used by the bot
herder. In addition to the IP address we had to establish the channel to serve as the
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command and control channel, and establish a password to log into the bot. Once the
research network was installed and functional as described in §3.3 It was just a matter
of executing the files. Once executed the bots would contact the IRC server and join
the predetermined channel. All we had to do was open an IRC client application, join
the same channel and log into the bots using the password specified in the compiled
code.
It is beyond the scope of this research project to go into further detail on the ca-
pabilities of each of the four bots. However, we do want to point out a few differences
that are key to some of the observations that we have made during our testing. First,
Agobot, Phatbot and Rxbot all have scanning capabilities built into them. This is
used to scan for vulnerabilities to be exploited. Sdbot 05b does not have a scanning
function built into it. Additionally, Rxbot uses a home grown cryptography system to
encode many of the commands it uses. It does have an option that allows it to work in
the clear without the cryptography portion. Throughout the source code, comments
are made advising against not using the cryptography. We found that Rxbot without
using the cryptography portion was inconsistent. We think there are bugs in the bot
source code when not using the cryptography. Because we could not get consistent
results from Rxbot, we dismissed this from any further tests.
4.1.1 Bothunter Experiments. Table 4.1 shows at a glance the number of
profiles that Bothunter detected during each one of the tests. The rest of this section
explains in further detail the tests performed and the results observed.
The first test was performed in order to create a baseline of the research network
traffic and to verify if Bothunter is prone to false positives. One of the metrics that
we kept track of was the number of packets that traversed the network during each
of the 90 minute tests. Additionally, we saved each packet from each one of the tests
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Table 4.1: Table showing bot detection results
Test Test # of Profiles # of Network
Number Description Detected Packets
1 Network only 0 1,490
2 Agobot only 204 4,115
3 Phatbot only 24 98,001
4 Sdbot only 0 2,533
5 Agobot with light traffic 131 74,840
6 Agobot with heavy traffic 99 529,598
7 All bots, no scanning 0 4,889
8 All Agobot scans, conservative 73 34,612
9 All Agobot scans, aggressive 73 33,990
10 All Agobot scans, conservative, light traffic 73 74,840
11 All Agobot scans, conservative, heavy traffic 73 468,785
12 Constant Sdbot UDP flood 0 93,757
in case there was a situation where we desired to replay the test. We found that the
total packet number from each test gives a fair indication as to the noise level of each
test. For the first test there were no bots on the network. With no bots, the network
produced 1,490 packets of traffic. Bothunter produced no false positives.
The second test was with Agobot on the network. Agobots default settings are
very ‘noisy’ relative to the quiet network. The network with Agobot produced 4115
packets of traffic, which is 36% more traffic than the network alone. Bothunter had no
problem whatsoever in identifying Agobot on an otherwise quiet network. Bothuner
reported 204 profiles at the end of this test. This is by far the greatest number of
profiles generated.
The third test was with Phatbot alone on the network. Phatbot is a newer ver-
sion of Agobot and has more command options associated with it. This scan caused
great difficulty. When given the command to start the scan, Phatbot monopolized the
CPU. With five workstations running and driving a constant 50 - 60% of the virutal
machine CPU it 100% maxed out the actual processors. As a result Wireshark the
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network capture utility was bogged down as was the keyboard, mouse and all other
software. It is unknown if 98,001 network packets is the true number or how the
slowdown affected Bothunter.
The fourth test was with Sdbot alone. As previously mentioned Sdbot does not
scan the network looking for open ports or other associated vulnerabilities. Sdbot
does send out keep alive messages, and over the 90 minute period had produced 2,533
packets on the network. Bothunter did not generate any profile for Sdbot. Sdbot was
configured to use the default IRC ports and maintained it’s command and control
channel throughout the test. After the 90 minute period expired and the results were
captured, we attempted to execute all of Sdbots commands. This included a DDoS
attack on one of the five workstations. We got constant status updates and computer
and network information from the workstations. Finally, we set up a file server on
the external workstation and used Sdbot to command all infected workstations to
download and execute an html file that we ironically named innocent.html (see Figure
4.1). Despite all the malicious logic and constant stream of IRC command and control
traffic Bothunter failed to generate a profile.
The fifth test was devised to see if Bothunter would be as successful in identi-
fying botnets in the presence of a nosier network. In other words, §2.9 points out the
problems associated with finding a ‘needle in a haystack’. This test, along with the
sixth test were designed to build a bigger ‘haystack’ for Bothunter. During this test
a small amount of traffic was introduced. As identified in §3.4 the traffic was taken
during a Cyber Exercise and contained traffic associated with a busier network than
our research network. This test introduced 74,840 packets of traffic on the network.
The results of this test support our hypothesis that in a noisy network it is harder to
spot the malicious packets. Even though nothing changed with the bot, and Agobot
performed the same scans it did during the previous test, Bothunter only identified
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot of a file that was downloaded and executed using Sdbot
131 profiles. This is a 64% drop in detection from Agobot on a quiet network.
The sixth test introduced even more traffic on the network. For this test I used
Sdbot to bombarded the network with as many packets as I could in 90 minutes.
During this test 529,598 packets were placed on the network for Bothunter to sort
through. Again, nothing changed with Agobot. It was started on its default settings
and was responsible for approximately four thousand of the traffic packets. However,
for the second time we saw a drop in the number of profiles that Bothunter generated.
During this test Bothunter produced 99 profiles. Figure 4.2 graphs the correlation of
Bothunter profiles and the number of packets on the network.
For the seventh test we initialized Agobot, Phatbot and Sdbot on four of the
five workstations. We then used a stop command to disable the scanning features
of Agobot and Phatbot. With scanning disabled the three bots together generated
4,889 packets of traffic on the network. The bots were the same bots, used the same
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Figure 4.2: Graph showing the drop in profiles as the packet number increased
command and control channels, ports and protocols as in previous tests, but with-
out scanning the network Bothunter failed to detect any of the bots posting 0 profiles.
One of the features of Agobot is the ability to specify how long you would like
to take to scan a network. In theory, if it takes longer to scan the network, less noise
and attention is warranted. Tests 8 & 9 were conducted to see if the aggressiveness
of the scan affects Bothunters profile generation. The results of these two tests are
interesting. Bothunter generated the exact same number of profiles for both of these
two scans. Additionally, we would have expected the more aggressive scan (take less
time) to produce more network packets than the more conservative scan. It could be
that there is a flaw in Agobot and that the timing feature does not work the way it
is documented. If Agobot does not work as advertised it could be that the two scans
were almost identical. This would explain the same number of profiles generated and
explain almost the same number of network packets. Another hypothesis is that the
way the multiple scans alternated confused Bothunter which led to the relatively low
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73 profiles when compared to Bothunters 204 profiles when only the default scanning
is enabled.
Tests 10 & 11 are another attempt to see if adding network traffic affects
Bothunters ability to generate bot profiles. During these two tests all of Agobots
scans are enabled similar to tests 8 & 9. However this time, using packet replay soft-
ware, light and heavy traffic is added. When light traffic is added a total of 74,840
packets is generated. When heavy traffic is added 468,785 packets traverse the net-
work. However, contrary to our hypothesis that ‘bigger haystacks’ lead to finding
less ‘needles’, Bothunter generated 73 profiles for both tests. Interestingly, this is the
same number as in tests 8 & 9. This evidence supports the hypothesis introduced in
the previous paragraph that when multiple scans are performed Bothunter is unable
to put the pieces together to generate additional profiles. Another hypothesis is that
Agobot does something very blatant that Bothunter picks it up no matter how many
scans or how much network traffic is being push under Bothunter. It is possible with
four Agobots on the network that in 90 minutes it performs this blatant action 73
times.
Finally, in one last effort to see if Bothunter would be capable of identifying
Sdbot, we used a Sdbot command to perform a UDP DDoS attack on one of the
workstations. Under this construct four workstations bombarded one of the worksta-
tions with UDP packets. The workstation chosen for the attack was the one that had
Bothunter running on it. 93,757 packets were generated in the 90 minute test and
Bothunter again failed to generate even a single profile.
Throughout all twelve tests it was also observed and recorded if the Command
and Control channel was identified. Table 4.2 shows the results.
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Table 4.2: Table showing C2 channel detection results
Test C2 Channel
Description Detected
Network only N/A
Agobot only YES
Phatbot only NO
Rxbot only NO
Sdbot only NO
Agobot with light traffic YES
Agobot with heavy traffic NO
All bots, no scanning NO
All bots, light scanning NO
All bots, heavy scanning NO
All bots, light scanning, light traffic NO
All bots, light scanning, heavy traffic NO
One of the claims that the authors of Bothunter makes [12] is that Bothunter is
capable of tracking the C2 channel. After all twelve tests were performed Bothunter
lived up to this claim only twice. Both were with Agobot, once on a quiet network
and once with only light network traffic. One hypothesis is that Bothunter fails to
correlate the needed pieces to identify the C2 channel when bombarded with unre-
lated traffic.
The tests performed lead us to conclude that Bothunter may live up to all of the
claims made by its authors in only the perfect of network circumstances. Bothunter
was able to detect two of the three bots. However, it should also be pointed out that
on a quiet network it produced zero false positives. This gives strong credence that
even one profile would be enough to alert a network administrator to the presence of
a botnet on the network. Finally, it was observed that the characteristic of scanning
played a large part in the detection as it failed to identify the bots when their scanning
was disabled.
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4.2 Testing Initialization Sequence
Once the competency of Bothunter has been determined the next step is to in-
troduce traffic onto the network that simulates the Cybercraft initialization sequence
presented in 3.4.1. Table 4.3 shows the number of profiles that Bothunter generated
for each of the three scenarios.
Table 4.3: Table showing the results of the three Cybercraft initialization sequence
scenarios.
Scenario Scenario # of Profiles # of Network
Number Description Detected Packets
1 Using HTTP traffic 0 9,182
2 Using ARP traffic 0 1,066
3 Using DNS traffic 0 1,906
The first scenario is centered around a single Cybercraft which needs to initialize
and plug into a command and control structure when there are no other Cybercraft
locally. In order to simulate this scenario and to have actual HTTP traffic on the
research network we created five webpages (see Figure 4.3). Each webpage simulates
a real world Internet webpage that could be accessed by a Cybercraft to gain informa-
tion on who to contact to plug into a command and control channel, or the webpage
itself could serve as the command and control channel. In order to test the stealth-
iness of this approach we used Wireshare to capture the packets of a workstation
visiting each of the five webpages. I then put the requests in a packet replay utility
and introduced other unrelated traffic. It was our hypothesis that this method would
be the method most prone to detection from Bothunter. We believed this because
HTTP traffic is one of the more popular methods in practice for a bot to exercise C2
on its zombies (see §2.5.1).
Our hypothesis was incorrect; Bothunter did not produce a profile during the
90 minute test. During the test the workstation that was simulating the Cybercraft
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visited in turn each of the five webpages 120 times. This stands to reason that the
Cybercraft could have had 600 different command and control messages and was ef-
fectively plugged into a command and control channel throughout the duration of the
test.
Figure 4.3: Screenshot showing webpage that could have C2 information
The second scenario assumes that a Cybercraft initializes on a network where
there is already a Cybercraft C2 presence. During this scenario a Cybercraft listens
and upon seeing ARP traffic with an encrypted code present contacts the sender of
the ARP message. After a 48-bit encrypted handshake the workstation contacts a
different Cybercraft and transfers 480 bits of information. This simulates a new node
joining a Chord P2P system. Furthermore we simulated a node leaving the Chord
constellation by contacting a neighboring Cybercraft (its successor) and transferring
480 bits of information. 480 bits of information is arbitrary and could be any length.
This process is recorded and replayed 10 times over the 90 minute test. This test
placed 1,066 packets on the network with ARP messages comprising 29.46% of those
packets. Bothunter did not generate a bot profile for this scenario. During the 90
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minute tests one of the Cybercraft platforms was in communication with an external
source downloading 11 webpages of information. Other Cybercraft were part of a
Chord system with said Cybercraft. Thus all Cybercraft in this scenario were effec-
tively plugged into a command and control channel throughout the duration of this
test.
The third and final scenario assumes the same Chord system exists as in scenario
2, but the Cybercraft that is in connection with the outside network communicates via
DNS messages instead of HTTP messages. During this scenario 1,906 packets were
placed on the network, 40 of those packets were DNS messages keeping the Chord
constellation in constant communication to an external Cybercraft throughout the
entire 90 minute test. Bothunter did not produce a profile for any of the communi-
cations during this test. Similarly to scenario one and two, the Cybercrafts were in
communication with an outside command and control channel during the entire 90
minute test.
It was the overall goal of this research to produce a methodology for a stealthy
Cybercraft initialization sequence. Bothunter, a current bot detection tool was chosen
and shown that it is capable of detecting bots in real time. Three scenarios were
chosen that represent three realistic Cybercraft situations. Bothunter was presented
with simulated traffic that would represent the presented methodology of a Cybercraft
initialization sequence for each of the three scenarios. It was shown that Bothunter
did not generate an alert for any of the three scenarios.
4.3 Significance
This research had three goals:
• Create a methodology for a Cybercraft platform to stealthily initialize and join
a command and control channel
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• Test the claims made that Bothunter is capable of detecting botnets in real
time.
• Test that the aforementioned initialization sequence will not be detected by the
botnet detection tool Bothunter
The results that followed these three goals contribute not only to the world of academia,
but help to further the Cybercraft project and the U.S. Air Force’s mission of fighting
and ‘winnning’ in cyberspace. This research stands as an unbiased 3rd party vali-
dating many of the claims made by the authors of Bothunter and thier respective
papers. In addition, it calls into question other claims made by the same authors.
However most importantly it was the goal of this research to help further the Cyber-
craft project by tackling the requirement for a stealthy initialization sequence to plug
into a command and control channel.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presented detailed results of the twelve experiments that were con-
ducted against the Bothunter bot detection tool. The results of testing the presented
methodology for a stealthy Cybercraft initialization sequence were presented. It was
shown that Bothunter did not detect the Cybercraft initialization sequence, and that
in all three scenarios the Cybercrafts enjoyed a command and control channel.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
This section provides another challenge to the stealthiness of the Cybercraft ini-tialization sequence discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The concept of ARP val-
idation is discussed with the ramifications to this research, and a solution is given
to evade the ARP validation tool XARP. Recommendations for future work are dis-
cussed. Finally a conclusion to this thesis is presented.
5.1 ARP Validation
It was shown in Chapter 4 that the methodology presented in this research
evades the bot detection tool Bothunter. After testing outlined in Chapter 3 was
completed the methodology was examined for weaknesses. It was determined that
there could be a flaw in the methodology. The methodology relies heavily on mod-
ified ARP messages. ARP messages were selected to be a fundamental part of the
stealthiness of the methodology because ARP messages are frequent, they are con-
stantly used between neighboring systems inside a network and they are frequently
examined. This section brings to light how the Cybercraft initialization sequence
would stand up to a tool that validates ARP requests. XArp is a tool written by
Ph.D student Christoph Mayer at the Institute of Telematics, University of Karlsruhe
(TH). XArp is a security application that uses advanced techniques to detect ARP-
based attacks [25].
We first ran a test to baseline XArp on the same research network as the tests
of Chapter 3 and 4. We ran XArp on the ‘high’ setting (see Figure 5.1) on a quiet
network. XArp produced 10,344 packets in 90 minutes. During the test XArp created
35 alerts. All of the alerts were false positives that claimed that ARP reply packets
came across the network without an associated request.
The next step was to run ARP the modifed ARP packets across XArp. XArp
flagged the packets that we were using as malicious. The reason is that we had been
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Figure 5.1: Screenshot of XArp a ARP validation utility from [25]
using the source MAC address to transfer encrypted data. XArp keeps a table of IP
addresses and their associated MAC addresses. XArp was able to easily verify that
our encrypted data was not the correct associated MAC address, so it flagged an Alert.
We were able to get around this limitation and successfully transmit encrypted
data. Rather than use the MAC address to transmit the data the destination IP can
be used. We were also able to place information in the ‘Extra Data’ field of the ARP
request to get around XArp, however, as a general practice the ’Extra Data’ field
could stand out more since it is rarely used.
Thus, we were able to conclude that XArp defiantly limits what fields can be
modified to send encrypted data using ARP, it is still possible to modify ARP requests
to pass data between devices located on the same LAN.
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5.2 Future Work
Bot detectors and ARP validation utilities are only two tools that are in a
network administrator or forensics examiners toolbox to aid their quest of keeping
malicious logic off their computers and out of their networks. There are other tools
and devices that could prove to detect the presented methodology of Cybercraft ini-
tialization and reveal the command and control channel. This research showed that
the given methodology could be implemented to evade the bot detection tool Both-
unter. Bothunter is built on Snort, a common IDS. Future work should focus on IDS
technologies and consider if there is an easy rule set that would expose the Cybercraft
initialization sequence. If there is a rule or set of rules that could easily identify the
Cybercraft methodology future work could add these rules to Bothunter and rerun
the tests to see if it identifies this methodology.
Another area to consider is hardware-based firewalls and routers. Many of these
devices can implement rules that stop packets from being forwarded. For example
some Cisco devices have what Cisco calls Dynamic ARP inspection [5]. Work should
be done to see if the methodology stands against these hardware tools.
Finally, it was not the purpose of this research project to build a Cybercraft
platform. Future work could implement the presented pseudo code in a virtual ma-
chine based rootkit. It is expected that a proof of concept Cybercraft platform based
on a VMBR would provide the same results against bot detection and ARP validation
as this research, but we cannot say for certain until the proof of concept exists and is
tested.
This research stands on the work of many people before me. We have incor-
porated many lessons learned from many different research projects into this work.
There is still much to be done towards the Cybercraft project and in the field of
cyberspace.
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5.3 Conclusion
It was the overall goal of this research to produce a methodology for a stealthy
Cybercraft initialization sequence. Bothunter, a current bot detection tool was chosen
and shown that it is capable of detecting bots in real time. Three scenarios were
chosen that represent three realistic Cybercraft situations. Bothunter was presented
with simulated traffic that would represent the presented methodology of a Cybercraft
initialization sequence for each of the three scenarios. It was shown that Bothunter did
not generate an alert for any of the three scenarios. The methodology for Cybercraft
initialization was put against XArp, a ARP validation utility. Some variables had to
be altered, but again the methodology was shown to be stealthy in the face of another
real time detection utility. Finally suggestions for continuing research on this project
are given.
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